THE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF SEMANTICS
Alfred Tarski
Table of Contents
TITLE
BEGINNING OF
ARTICLE
I. EXPOSITION
- THE MAIN PROBLEM -- A SATISFACTORY DEFINITION OF TRUTH
- THE EXTENSION OF THE WORD "TRUE"
- THE MEANING OF THE WORD "TRUE"
- A CRITERION FOR THE MATERIAL ADEQUACY OF THE DEFINITION
- TRUTH AS A SEMANTICAL CONCEPT
- LANGUAGES WITH A SPECIFIED STRUCTURE
- THE ANTINOMY OF THE LIAR
- THE INCONSISTENCY OF SEMANTICALLY CLOSED LANGUAGES?
- OBJECT-LANGUAGE AND META-LANGUAGE
- CONDITIONS FOR A POSITIVE SOLUTION OF THE MAIN PROBLEM
- THE CONSTRUCTION (IN OUTLINE) OF THE DEFINITION
- CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEFINITION
- EXTENSION OF THE RESULTS TO OTHER SEMANTIC NOTIONS
II.
POLEMICAL REMARKS
- IS THE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH THE "RIGHT" ONE?
- FORMAL CORRECTNESS OF THE SUGGESTED DEFINITION OF TRUTH
- REDUNDANCY OF SEMANTIC TERMS -- THEIR POSSIBLE ELIMINATION
- CONFORMITY OF THE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH WITH PHILOSOPHICAL AND
COMMON-SENSE USAGE
- THE DEFINITION IN ITS RELATION TO "THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF TRUTH" AND
TO VARIOUS EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRENDS
- ALLEGED METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS IN SEMANTICS
- APPLICABILITY OF SEMANTICS TO SPECIAL EMPIRICAL SCIENCES
- APPLICABILITY OF SEMANTICS TO THE METHODOLOGY OF EMPIRICAL SCIENCE
- APPLICABILITY OF SEMANTICS TO DEDUCTIVE SCIENCE
- FINAL REMARKS
BIBLIOGRAPHY